In a single, sweeping reform, the Kremlin aims to remake higher education: forging a direct pipeline from enrollment to a specific job — and reinstating the practice of assigning graduates to workplaces. The previous tacit social contract in education is being canceled: state-funded education is no longer a personal asset or the student’s private matter, but a state investment that must be paid back. In 2026, the contours of the new model can already be clearly seen, which is what senior research fellow at Tel Aviv University Ivan Baydakov has done at the request of T-invariant.
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After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian authorities launched an overhaul of higher education in the country. Universities are now viewed as a tool for producing specialists for sectors of the economy that are currently prioritized and facing shortages. This shift sets the overall framework for the reform. The various changes — the restructuring of educational levels, the introduction of targeted training, and the tying of graduates to their professions — can now be seen as elements of a single institutional logic.
The gradual abandonment of the Bologna model — via a pilot project launching in September 2026 that will affect 17 universities — marks a break with the previous system. In place of the familiar “bachelor–master” structure will come “a single integrated cycle of study lasting from four to six years” — a specialist degree involving early professionalization and limited flexibility in students’ educational trajectories. The new system of higher education will be fully rolled out in the coming years.
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The new education system
● In place of the bachelor’s, specialist’s, and (in part) master’s degrees will come foundational higher education (4–6 years); in November 2025 the Ministry of Science and Higher Education clarified that study durations will vary depending on the field complexity — from four years for humanities fields to 5–6 years for engineering and technical specialties.
● In place of the master’s degree, residency, and assistantship-internship will come specialized higher education (1–3 years).
● Postgraduate studies will be separated into a distinct level of professional education focused exclusively on training highly qualified personnel and research activity.
Another fundamental change: it will become difficult to change one’s specialization or adjust the field of study during studies. The Bologna system and the “2+2+2” model allowed that after the first two years a student could change trajectory, and then again upon entering a master’s program. In the new configuration, this window is minimized.
Why does the state want this?
First and foremost, it is linked to the introduction of a general education “core” of subjects (Russian history, philosophy, fundamentals of Russian statehood, etc.) and “a foundational component common to a given field of study” at the initial stage of study. According to the Ministry of Science and Higher Education’s plan, after completing the “core” (the first two years of study), students will be able to change their major, but only within an approved related group of majors or fields of training.
This idea is not new to the Russian higher education system: it has long been implemented at certain universities, for example Tyumen State University (where the current Minister of Science and Higher Education Valery Falkov worked for many years) and the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANHIGS). Moreover, the development of this practice was defined as a strategic objective in the “Priority-2030” program, where one of the target indicators was the flexibility of academic programs and students’ ability to choose individual development paths.
However, the fundamental difference in the new model lies in the normative formalization of the “core.” Previously, universities had autonomy and could determine the content of the “core” disciplines and place them at different points in the program depending on the specifics of the field. In the new concept, both the place and the composition of the “core” are strictly fixed at the beginning of study. This “deferred choice” (in reality — a real opportunity for a seamless transition) is now limited to the very start of training. Once the unified block ends, the program sharply shifts toward specialization. After completing the general-education “core” (typically by the end of the second year), any attempt to change trajectory may result in an accumulation of critical academic differences exceeding established norms. This significantly complicates adjustments to the educational path and turns learning into movement by inertia inside a previously chosen “pipeline.”
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This “pipeline” now extends to the level of specialized higher education (a kind of equivalent to the master’s degree). According to the new strategy, the master’s degree ceases to be a tool for changing professions and becomes a strictly field-specific extension positioned as a stage for acquiring “advanced professional knowledge based on the existing profile.”
Another important innovation is the de facto ban on admission to a master’s program in unrelated specialties. In the new model, specialized higher education will be divided into types (research, professional, and managerial), and the most in-demand among them (research and professional) will be accessible only with a relevant foundational higher education in the same field. This means that the “second chance” to change career direction during one’s studies, which the master’s degree previously provided, is effectively eliminated. Thus, students who do not change direction in the first year of study enter a “pipeline” that leads them through five years of foundational higher education straight into a narrowly specialized master’s program in the same field. The cost of a mistake at admission becomes critical, and institutional barriers effectively eliminate the viability of the “2+2+2” model, depriving both the system and students of tools for flexible adaptation and the possibility of obtaining a multidisciplinary education.
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According to a study by the Higher School of Economics published in the journal Higher Education in Russia in 2025, based on data from the “Monitoring of Graduate Employment,” 66% of master’s graduates are recent bachelor’s graduates (who continued their studies within five years after receiving their bachelor’s diploma).
Among full-time bachelor’s graduates, 36% enter a master’s program in the first few years after graduation, with 93% of them doing so without interruption in their studies.
About a quarter of bachelor’s graduates who continued their studies change their field of study when transitioning to a master’s program.
Changes in educational trajectory in the form of changes in field of study, university, or region occur noticeably more often among those who enter a master’s program after a break than among graduates who continue immediately after completing their bachelor’s degree.
Thus, the data show that the master’s degree in the existing higher education system is used by a significant portion of bachelor’s graduates to change their previously chosen educational trajectory. The very possibility of changing one’s profile served as an institutional safety valve against the error of an early choice and as a response to the changing demands of the labor market while studying.
The new logic of completely restructuring students’ educational trajectories extends to entry into the profession. This is currently being implemented most rigidly in healthcare: on March 1, 2026, a law entered into force requiring three-year mandatory service for graduates of medical universities and colleges in state institutions. Under the label “adaptation under the guidance of a mentor,” elements of mandatory assignment are in fact being reproduced. The residency system has been transformed similarly: the share for targeted training in certain fields has been raised to 100%, making it impossible to obtain a narrow specialization without a commitment to fulfill the obligation.
Such “binding” of specialists is being scaled to other key sectors as well:
● Pedagogy. The State Duma discussed introducing mandatory placement of graduates to schools to combat the shortage of subject-matter teachers — as a measure to address the shortage of teachers. Information about the mandatory return of pedagogy graduates to schools was later refuted. However, in 2025 the State Duma passed a law expanding the ability of students in non-pedagogical fields (after the third year) to teach in schools under conditions of personnel shortages.
● Engineering and the military-industrial complex. A model of specialized grants is being introduced that legally binds the student to an obligation to work at a specific enterprise, through the expansion of the “Professionalitet” program.
● Agricultural sector. In a number of regions, access to state-funded education is now conditional on the existence of a tripartite agreement with an agro-holding, which ties the graduate to a specific location of employment.
Education as workforce supply
The restriction of students’ horizontal mobility and the transformation of the learning process into an “educational pipeline” appears not merely as an accidental side effect of the reform, but as a forced and systematic response to labor shortages. To guarantee the supply of specialists into priority sectors, the system is shifting from soft regulation through the promotion of job creation to direct administrative control, which is now beginning to extend even to the private sector of higher education (see the detailed analysis by T-invariant).
In the Unified Plan for achieving the national development goals of the Russian Federation through 2030 (approved by the Government of the Russian Federation), the system of professional and higher education is viewed as one of the key tools. The main levers are admission quotas, targeted training, and other forms of state regulation of admissions and the structure of educational programs. Priority in the allocation of resources and state-funded places is linked first and foremost to ensuring technological sovereignty. Thus, higher and professional education within the Unified Plan is treated not as an autonomous sector, but as an element of the system for producing personnel to achieve national development goals.
The most important policy lever is becoming the introduction of institutional control over tuition-based education. The state is limiting the financial autonomy of universities: a university is now substantially restricted in independently determining the volume of paid admissions, which previously was based on its own view of market demand. The number of paid slots must be strictly aligned with the state’s forecast of the need for specialists. Previously, universities used mass enrollment in popular fields as a source of income separate from the state, but this practice is now subject to limits approved by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education.
In the new conditions, the role of private universities — which by their nature are focused on market demand rather than workforce planning — remains an open question. Two trends can be observed. First, the state has mandated (Decree No. 1830) private organizations to align their paid admissions on the same terms as state universities. This removes their key advantage — the ability to quickly open programs in response to current market demand.
Second, a parallel trend can be observed of the systematic revocation of accreditation from non-state universities, using non-compliance with criteria for research activity as grounds. In particular, by the end of 2025 Rosobrnadzor applied severe measures to a number of non-state universities:
● Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences (Shaninka). In December 2025 Rosobrnadzor suspended the university’s license.
● St. Petersburg Institute of Foreign Economic Relations, Economics and Law (IVESSEP). In July 2025 the agency finally revoked the license, shutting down the university after 30 years of operation.
● Institute of Business Career and Academy of Management and Production. Deprived of accreditation in key areas following inspections in autumn 2025.
● Ural Institute of Economics, Management and Law. Deprived of state accreditation in a number of areas on the grounds of non-compliance with new standards.
● Altai Academy of Economics and Law (Barnaul). After a prolonged ban on admissions and deprivation of accreditation, the university was closed.
Alongside financial restrictions in higher education, a policy of tightening requirements for the offering of specialized higher education programs (master’s degrees) is being formed. In official materials and public statements by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, it is emphasized that master’s training requires that a university has a developed research infrastructure, stable research teams, and staff capable of providing in-depth training and a research component. Within the framework of the proposed new model of higher education, the master’s degree is viewed not as a mass level but as a selective second cycle, not available to all students and not to every university. This may lead to the concentration of the ability to offer master’s programs in a limited group of universities that possess confirmed research standing and a resource base.
Restriction of scientific autonomy
An important element of this model is the restoration of elements of the Soviet hierarchy of science management through the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). In 2024–2025, the Academy’s expert powers evolved from advisory to actual administrative ones. RAS conclusions are now a mandatory requirement for conducting of budgeted research at all stages: from planning to final reporting. Contrary to the previous soft model, a explicit rule has been established whereby the absence of a positive RAS conclusion on applied projects by April 1, 2026, leads to the automatic withdrawal and reallocation of budget funding. Additional stability to this vertical was ensured by transferring control of the Higher Attestation Commission (VAK) and key information resources to the Academy. Thus, in 2024–2025 the RAS has de jure and de facto established itself as the centralized expert and administrative hub through which the distribution of state research funding passes.
A structural conflict of interest is built into this scheme: the RAS, as one of the largest recipients of state scientific funding, simultaneously acts as the ultimate arbiter of its direct competitors — the universities.
Since the master’s degree in the new system is rigidly tied to the presence of stable scientific schools, the expert dictate of the RAS may become a tool for “filtering out” universities from the advanced level of education. And without an independent and recognized scientific base, universities automatically lose the ability to offer master’s programs.
Under the expected tightening of requirements for the implementation of specialized higher education programs, geographic differentiation and segmentation of universities can be expected. It is likely that the most resource-heavy and research-oriented graduate-level programs will develop primarily at universities with large-scale research infrastructure and special institutional status. These include, above all, universities in Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as federal and certain national research universities. In this case, applicants seeking in-depth and specialized training may more often see educational migration to these centers as a rational strategy.
For some universities (presumably regional ones), such a configuration may lead to not only functional transformation but also the risk of institutional decline in status. Under conditions of the concentration of specialized higher education programs in a limited group of second-cycle universities, such institutions may lose some of their academic significance and face reduced opportunities for growth. Combined with tighter state regulation of paid admissions, this creates preconditions for selection within the university market and the weeding out of weaker institutions.
Convergence of higher education and secondary vocational education
An important aspect of both the limits on horizontal mobility and the addressing of personnel shortages is the changes taking place at the intersection of higher education and secondary vocational education.
New barriers are being introduced at the entry to universities for college (secondary vocational) graduates. On September 1, 2025, amendments entered into force, under which the option of admission to a university without the Unified State Exam, via internal examinations, is retained only on the condition of strict field alignment. This decision is aimed at closing the “bypass route,” in which a college was used as a way to avoid standardized exams for a subsequent change of specialty (for example, from a law college to a psychology department at a university). Now a graduate of the secondary vocational education level is effectively locked in the initial qualification: any attempt to transition requires taking the Unified State Exam on equal terms with high school graduates, which makes it harder to change trajectory and becomes an additional incentive to join the labor market with the first qualification obtained.
On the other hand, the state is introducing more flexible mechanisms for integration into the labor market through the convergence of different levels of education. As part of the reform, it is proposed to gradually introduce the practice of allowing a student to obtain a vocational qualification even before completing the full university course. Apparently, this refers to the creation of a “higher + vocational” education. Previously, the lack of a clear legal concept of an “intermediate” diploma created a barrier: a student who successfully completed two years formally could not take positions requiring relevant qualifications. Now, in the context of the transition to the new model of higher education, the emphasis is shifting toward early practical training. Such a measure creates an “intermediate exit point” for the learner: if necessary, they can begin formal employment in their specialty with a credential confirming secondary vocational education for the employer/HR department, while even continuing their studies in parallel to obtain a higher education degree.
The economy receives a qualified employee two years earlier than with the completion of a standard bachelor’s degree. This model, working in combination with the “Professionalitet” project, effectively blurs the rigid boundary between levels of education.
In summary, the 2022–2026 Russian higher education reform establishes a unified institutional framework where universities shift from autonomous entities into essential infrastructure for meeting labor market demands. The key parameters of the educational process — the learning trajectory, the volume of admissions (including paid), admission to specialized higher education programs, and (in a number of fields) the subsequent employment of graduates — are set by external authorities and are directly linked to current labor shortages. Changes in approaches to educational flexibility, the normative formalization of mandatory elements, and the reduction of switching opportunities institutionally raise the cost of a mistake in the early choice of profile for the student and “lock in” the educational trajectory. And the expansion of targeted training and systems of mandatory service by graduates complements this logic, forming a controlled route from university admission to a specific workplace.
At the same time, the restrictions imposed on master’s programs and the strengthening of the scientific hierarchy, including the expanded role of the RAS, narrow the scientific and organizational autonomy of universities and create conditions for segmentation of the university system. The convergence of higher education and secondary vocational education completes this construction, making it possible to move students into the labor market at earlier stages of study and reducing incentives for extended education. Overall, this marks a shift from a model where higher education expanded the space of individual life choices and professional strategies to a model oriented toward minimizing the state’s and key sectors’ workforce risks — at the cost of reducing graduates’ professional autonomy and reducing the adaptability of the entire higher education system.